Rational versus Intuitive Reasoning in Moral Judgement: A Review of Current Research Trends and New Directions

Swagata Choudhuri and Jayanti Basu
University of Calcutta, Kolkata

Reasoning is an important aspect of judgement. The role of intuitive versus rational reasoning in arriving at moral judgement has been a debated issue. This paper aims at documenting the current status of research in his debate. Early literature in the field of moral reasoning is briefly presented. The relative importance of intuition and reasoning in moral judgement is discussed, substantiated by theoretical premises and empirical works. The dearth of literature in moral reasoning in India is emphasised and scope for further research is highlighted.

Keywords: Moral reasoning, Intuitionism, Rationalism, Dual Process Model.

There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.
-William Shakespeare.

Thinking is instrumental in moral judgement. What might be the nature of the thinking process that may have such evaluative implications: is it spontaneous and intuitive or a product of rational deliberation? While some philosophers and psychologists emphasize the role of intuitive morality in humans, others have considered controlled rational reasoning as crucial to moral judgment. This paper would selectively review some of the modern research evidences pertaining specifically to this debate. In its focus on moral judgment, defined here as the cognitive precursor to decision making, the review excludes the studies on moral behaviour, and hence is limited in scope. However, in the first two sections, we would discuss the general outline of philosophical and empirical concerns with morality in general to locate the review in perspective.

Pre-modern Notions of Morality

Concern with Morality has characterized all civilizations. The major social and religious texts of ancient civilizations are replete with ambiguities and conflicts in conceptualizing the morally right or wrong. Specifically, in the Indian context, such moral dilemmas have been raised and solved by the protagonists and other characters of the ancient Hindu texts like the Ramayana and the Mahābhãrata. The different Purãnas of our country raise moral issues that have been resolved in manners that may or may not be endorsed by today's standards. These ancient texts often include complex justification / reasoning of the actions, and offer elaborate arguments about morality, as in the 'Anushãshana Parva' of the Mahãbhãrata. Ancient Indian concepts distinguished between two types of morality: Karma (deed) and Dharma (justice) (Smith, 1991). Since Hinduism is not a single faith, but a system of interlocking social, spiritual and political concepts (McDaniel, 2007; Radhakrishnan, 1923/ 1996), often the moral issues were enmeshed with social and political issues or 'Rajadharma', or were concerned with 'greater good' defined for the specific historical moment (Radhakrishnan, 1947). Example in support is 'Manusamhitã', whereas Cãnakya's texts imply the relativity and situational variability of moral dictums. Other prevalent religions of the South Asia, including Islam, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism and their derivatives, as well as ancient religions in Middle East have their own commentary on moral behaviour and thought, a study of which would place Psychology of morality in historical and geographical context.

In the occidental world, perhaps the first instance of moral dilemma occurred when Eve defied the rules of the Garden of Eden. The Sophists of the early Greek world illustrated the

nature and need of moral conduct. The stories of the Greek epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, also revolve round moral conflicts of sexuality and justification of war or aggression. Since display of valour in warfare always entails violation of survival rights of other people, an issue equally pertinent today, much of moral reasoning has to deal with justification of aggression. Morality has always been associated with religion throughout the world, but when Christianity gained wide acceptance in the Western world, morality took a specific shape and influenced much of the modern literature on moral Psychology afterward.

Early Period of Modern Research on Morality

As in many other domains of Psychology, what we now study under Psychology of Morality is influenced by the Post Enlightenment scholarship. Of course, the debate between intuition and rationality appears in Post Enlightenment scholarship before Psychology as a discipline was established. Eighteenth century philosophers, David Hume and Immanuel Kant, raised questions on use of reason in morality. According to Hume, moral knowledge is attained by an "immediate feeling and finer internal sense," not by a "chain of argument and induction" (Hume, 1776/1965, p. 24). This approach, emphasizing the passionate nature of man and often called empiricism, was opposed by the proponents of rationalism such as Kant (1785/1959) who argued that rationality was more important for moral actions.

Although the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget's theory of moral development is considered by many as a pioneering work within mainstream Psychology, psychological research relating to moral development dates back earlier. The works of Freud (1923), especially his conceptualisation of superego reflects issues of moral concern. Superego was conceptualized by Freud as irrational and relentless, although guised under rationality. In 1925, two English scholars, Macaulay and Watkins, published their study on environmental influences on development of moral values (Kay, 1970). Hartshorne, May and Maller (1929), conducted a five year project called the 'character education enquiry' on secondary school children and identified several complex factors producing moral behaviours.

Piaget, in his pioneering book, *The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932),* laid the foundation for theoretical explanations of moral development, based on his observation of children playing marbles. Chronologically, Havighurst and Taba's (1949) work on character of school children, and Gessel and Ilg's (1946) proposition of a sequential nature of moral development are subsequent significant contributions. However none of these works became as influential as that of Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) who extended Piaget's theory and attempted to measure moral development. According to Kohlberg, moral reasoning develops across six stages which may be categorised under three levels: Level I: Preconventional Morality having the two sub stages of i) Punishment and obedience orientation, and ii) naïve hedonism; Level II : Conventional Morality having the sub stages of i) "Good Boy" or "Good Girl" Orientation and ii) Social-Order-Maintaining Morality; Level III) Post conventional (or Principled) Morality incorporating the stages of i)The Social-Contract Orientation and ii) Morality of Individual Principles of Conscience. These stages are sequential and universal in nature.

Kohlberg's contribution was not limited to the theorisation and measurement of moral judgements but also in proffering a cognitive approach to morality as opposed to the behavioural and the psychoanalytical theory. Kohlberg's influence dominated the field of moral psychology for almost a decade and half, inspiring animated research (Haidt, 2008). Carol Gilligan (1982) critiqued Kohlberg's concept as gender-biased. She argued against Kohlberg's justice perspective that emphasizes only right and wrong derived on the basis of only male participants. Gilligan spoke of a care perspective, which argues in favour of interpersonal relationships, communication, and concern for others (Santrock, 2005). Critics suggest that Gilligan had overemphasised the role of gender in moral reasoning. Jaffe and Hyde's (2000) meta-analyses failed to support Gilligan's claims. The obtained differences could be attributed to the stories of moral dilemma rather than the gender of the participants (Santrock, 2005).

Nancy Eisenberg proposed a theory of prosocial reasoning and argued that dilemmas like those presented by Kohlberg, were difficult for children to understand. Using simpler short stories and on the bases of cross-sectional as well as longitudinal studies, Eisenberg (1982, 1991) proposed that prosocial reasoning developed in an age-related sequence, following six distinct stages. Eisenberg may be credited as the first researcher synthesizing cognitive, conative, and affective domains of morality (Berk, 2008).

These earlier stage theories viewed moral reasoning from a developmental perspective, examining how moral reasoning evolved. This developmental perspective has been associated with the controversy about evolutionary origin of moral/pro-social behaviour (Wilson, 2012). Although developmental theories have tried to establish the development of the moral system in children, they were silent about its operations and changes in adulthood. Does exposure to counter attitudinal stimuli change the way of moral reasoning? If reasoning is a cognitive function, then, is moral reasoning under the influence of any cognitive biases? The early theories failed to address these issues.

The New Approach to Moral Judgment

Heider (1958) was one of the pioneers who stressed the importance of reasoning in causal attributions, by stating that people act like naïve scientists. Fiske and Taylor (1991) challenged this view and held that humans are actually 'cognitive misers' who avoid engaging in effortful thoughts, thereby, often leading to biases. Elliot Turiel (1983) developed a 'domain theory' of morality that properly distinguished between social reasoning and moral reasoning. The social conventional rules are created for the purpose of maintaining social order and system. Moral conventions, contrarily, involve the concept of justice. Moral rules are obligatory and may be impersonal (Turiel, 2006).

The beginning of the present century was marked by some influential works on morality which changed the field of moral psychology considerably. Haidt and Kesebir (2010) righty stated: 'Moral psychology is undergoing a multi disciplinary renaissance, and social psychology is one of the central fields in 'this new synthesis'" (p. 797). Some of these newer contributions touching specifically upon intuition versus reasoning in moral judgment are briefly discussed here.

Social Intuitionist Model (SIM)

Jonathan Haidt proposed the social intuitionist model (SIM) of moral judgement. SIM emphasises the importance of quick automated processes over slow deliberative processes. In his acclaimed work titled, 'The Emotional Dog and His Rational Tail' (2001), Haidt challenged the rationalist trend and proposed that rational thinking is at the mercy of emotion. The social aspect of SIM is derived from the fact that moral judgement is, indeed, an interpersonal process (Haidt, 2001).

Haidt objectively defined intuition and reasoning. The process of moral intuitions are "the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion" (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). Moreover, it is an automatic process that almost always has an affective tinge. When these affective reactions are very strong and adequately differentiated, they may be called moral emotions like gratitude, disgust etc. (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).

Moral reasoning is "conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given information about people (and situations) in order to reach a moral judgement". Moral judgement is not the same as moral reasoning. Moral reasoning may be defined as "evaluations (good versus bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with respect to a set of virtues held by a culture or subculture to be obligatory" (Haidt, 2001, p.817). Moral intuition is not a kind of reasoning but is cognition (Haidt, 2001, p.814).

Haidt, Bjorklund and Murphy (2000) cite the occurrence of 'moral dumbfounding' to support claims of the dominant nature of intuitions over rationality. Moral dumbfounding is said to occur when people fail to give proper reasons or strong

arguments in favour of their moral judgements. In an interesting experiment, five stories were presented to 30 undergraduate participants (17 females and 13 males): one 'moral reasoning' story, two stories of 'moral intuition', and two about 'non-moral intuition'. The participants failed to provide strong reasons in favour of judgements they made for stories of intuitive primacy. Often, they stated very clearly that they had no reasons in favour of their judgements.

Subsequent support for SIM is, however, mixed. Therefore, Haidt could not totally ignore the rationalist aspect and recognized occasional importance of deliberation. This is called the principle of 'intuitive primacy but not dictatorship' (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). In this context, Haidt recognised the role of expertise in moral judgement. 'Trained and socialised' philosophers may successfully reason, even about disturbing issues. Finally, Haidt proposed two 'links' that may encourage reasoning in moral judgement—reasoned judgement and private reflection. In reasoned judgement, logic guides decision. In private reflection, reflective thinking about the issue may activate a new intuition. Pizzaro and Bloom (2003) proposed a third process, where reasoning may influence prior judgement that shapes intuitions. The reasoning may be constructed by either prior cognitive appraisal or by controlling the information one may attend to. The role of expertise is also challenged by Pizzaro and Bloom (2003) who held that several non-professionals exercise reasoned judgement in different situations.

Haidt and Joseph (2007) further proposed the moral foundation theory (MFT) claiming that five sets of 'innate intuitions' guide morality. These are: Care/harm foundation, the Fairness/cheating foundation, the Loyalty/betrayal foundation, the Authority/subversion foundation and the Sanctity/degradation foundation. These foundations are innate and evolutionary and are shaped by experiences during development. SIM may be considered as a prequel to MFT where the intuitions are categorised and their cultural differences explained (Graham, Haidt, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik, & Ditto, in press). For a more detailed discussion of MFT, see Renner, Ramalingam and Pirta (2013).

Haidt's theory had been one of the most influential works in moral as well as social psychology. Yet, it has some unclarified issues. For example, Haidt did not elaborate if intuitions could be altered by moral training in childhood. The intuitions are also not measurable as strong or weak. Do only one or more than one intuition occurs? How are they selected over one another? Finally, in real life, situations may arise where one has to speak against one's intuitive or original evaluation of the situation. A lawyer may have to defend a client whose innocence may not be convincing. What would happen if the person is forced to reason against one's spontaneous evaluations? Systematic studies are rare.

The Dual Process Model

While Haidt emphasised the importance of spontaneous evaluations, the dual process model (Greene, 2007; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Somerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) accommodates both empiricism and rationalism by incorporating the automatic and controlled processes as parallel to each other rather than having a primacy of one over the other. The type of judgement in context is important in deciding whether intuition or reasoning is of salience. Two types of moral judgement are identified: deontological moral judgement and utilitarian/consequentialist judgements. Deontological judgements are concerned with rights and duties whereas utilitarian/consequentialist judgements are concerned with the greater good. Intuitive reasons are more common in deontological judgements and utilitarian / consequentialist judgements are guided more by controlled cognitive processes such as moral reasoning (Greene & Paxton, 2010).

An fMRI study by Greene et al. (2001) found that two types of reasoning involve two different areas of the brain. They employed 60 different moral versus non-moral dilemmas further categorised as 'morally personal' and 'morally impersonal'. Two sets of experiments were conducted where nine participants responded to the 60 dilemmas indicating whether the action

was appropriate or not while simultaneously undergoing brain scanning using fMRI. ANOVA conducted on the obtained images reflect the involvement of different brain areas for moral personal, moral impersonal and nonmoral conditions. The limbic system, which is responsible for basic emotions, is mainly activated when personal dilemmas are presented to the subjects. The frontal regions of the brain, known for its role in cognitive function and memory, are activated by impersonal dilemmas. However, the results could not be replicated by Moore, Clark and Kane (2008) under more controlled conditions.

Greene's model has also enjoyed some empirical support. Paxton, Unger, and Greene (2011) analysed the role of 'reasoning and reflection' in moral judgement through two experiments. In the first experiment, 98 females and 52 males (Mean age: 32.53 years) were asked to complete the cognitive reflection test (CRT) either before or after responding to moral dilemmas. The CRT purported to 'induce more reflective moral judgement' (p.3). The items of CRT encourage rapid intuitive answers to questions, which apparently seems correct but is actually wrong. The subjects were randomly assigned to any one of the conditions. Three moral dilemmas, developed by Greene et al. (2001) were employed. The common aspect of the dilemmas was, either to kill one person or let many others survive or saving the person at the cost of others lives. It was hypothesized that since the CRT promotes more reflection, participants receiving CRT first, would give more utilitarian judgements. According to Greene's theory of dual process (2001) utilitarian/consequentialist judgements are guided more by rational process rather than emotional or intuitive ones (Paxton et al., 2011). Therefore, CRT would increase the rational processes, namely, reasoning and reflection, thereby, increasing utilitarian judgements. This would then result in a decision in favour of killing one person to save the others. The participants had to respond either in favour or against the utilitarian judgement and rate the judgement on a seven point scale of acceptability. The experiment was then followed up using slightly modified dilemmas to rule out the role of CRT in creating a positive

effect. The results indicated that reflection is indeed associated with utilitarian judgement thereby emphasising the role of reflective thinking in such types of moral judgement.

In a second experiment, Paxton et al. (2011) explored the process of reasoned reflection by using two criteria: the strength of an argument and the time taken for coming to a judgement. The participants (79 females, 61 males, 2 gender unspecified; mean age: 23.69 years) read a passage describing an incident of consensual incest. The participants were then asked to read either a strong or a weak argument, supporting the incest. After this, about half of the subjects were randomly selected to think about the argument for an additional two minutes. The argument remained on screen during this phase of reflection. Then, the participants rated the acceptability of the incestuous behaviour on a seven-point scale and completed some demographic information and a personality questionnaire. The hypothesis, that the extra time for reflection would be influential in moral judgement was confirmed.

However, moral reasoning and decision-making is more complex than most other cognitive processes (Rest, 1983). It is often difficult to specify the exact process of reasoning or the mediating factors. In some cases, the conflict of reasoning and intuition may not be a sufficient explanation. For example in Milgram's (1963) controversial study on obedience behaviour, subjects continued to administer painful stimuli, despite knowing the consequences for the victim. Neither intuition nor reason could explain such judgment. Thus, it is evident that reading a hypothetical dilemma and facing a practical moral conflict may be quite different from each other. Moreover, these hypothetical dilemmas may be quite disturbing for the subjects because the usual conflict is between killing one person and saving the lives of many (for example, the Footbridge dilemma or the Crying baby dilemma by Greene et al., 2001). In an experimental set up, several actions may be justified; hence it is really difficult to comment what the subject would do in real life situation.

Universal Moral Grammar (UMG)

A third model, often less discussed, is based on the works of Hauser (2006) and Mikhail (2007). This model, known as universal moral grammar (UMG), is influenced by Chomsky's (1965) work that proposes an innate moral grammar in everyone. Moral grammar may be explained as 'a complex and possibly domain-specific set of rules, concepts and principles that generates and relates mental representations of various types' (Mikhail, 2007, p.144).

Mikhail (2007) proposes evidence from the fields of psychology, linguistics, anthropology, and cognitive neuroscience, supporting UMG, although he recognized their limitations. Since moral reasoning of children follows the patterns of a well-developed legal template, there may be an innate universal moral code with evolutionary implication. Words representing deontic (what should be and what should not) is present in almost all natural languages (Bybee & Fleischman, 1995). Prohibition of certain acts like rape, murder, stealing is common across all cultures. Respect for parents, virtues of truth and honesty etc. are universally endorsed. This too indicates the universal nature of moral dictums. Finally, neuroimaging studies have identified brain regions involved in moral decision-making (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Moll, Ignacio, Bramati, Caparelli-Daquer, & Eslinger 2005), although it is still a debated issue.

UMG is an intriguing construct which may be considered as a promising field of research. It has liberated moral psychology from the debates of relative primacy of reasoning and intuitions. The innateness of morality has now been addressed and documented in a few recent works (e.g. Prinz, in press). Every culture has certain set norms and parameters that induce the building of certain moral systems in some particular ways. It is difficult to acquire a second set of moral judgements (Hauser, 2006). These grammars then, automatically and unconsciously gives rise to judgements, and conscious reasoning has a very negligible role to play in this. Thus, if the same dilemma is presented in two different but similar versions, then two different evaluations would arise (Mikhail, 2007).

UMG then, raises an important question. If the version of the dilemma is important in the type of judgement arrived at, then the framing of the same case by two different lawyers can trigger two different judgements or lines of argument. Also, the same news, when written by two different reporters may actually lead to different evaluation of the event or issue, in spite of the essential content remaining the same. These issues open further research possibilities in moral psychology.

Both UMG and MFT emphasize the innate nature of morality and describe how experience tunes it. While MFT categorises intuitions, UMG inquires about the constitution of moral knowledge, how they are acquired, processed in the brain, used, and finally, how moral knowledge evolve in humans. Unlike the SIM or the dual process model, it does not debate over the relative primacy of intuitions and rationales but employs linguistic analogies to explain moral reasoning.

Empirical works in India

It may be told with confidence that in the ancient era, Indian thoughts on moral behaviour and judgment were by far more sophisticated and had significant application in everyday life and in politics, in comparison to those of the Western world, Pagan or Christian. Relevant ideas may be extrapolated from works of Dalal and Misra (2010), Paranjape (1998), Pirta (2012), Sinha (1997) etc., although direct efforts to record moral issues from Indian texts are still wanting. Unfortunately, in empirical research in India, moral psychology is a relatively ignored field. Yet, it is one of those domains where a clear distinction from the West could have been obtained, as moral acts and moral reasoning are dependent on a plethora of cultural variables including caste, gender roles and characteristic patterns of religious faith that distinguish India from the West. Some of the earlier empirical works of course focused on research on various aspects of social and developmental aspects in connection with moral reasoning. An early study compared Hindu Brahmin children of India and Judeo-Christian families of Chicago; startling differences are found with regard to their moral reasoning (Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1987.) In India, violation of social customs is as bad as violation of morality

or harming another person. Thus, culture-specific patterns may have religious and moral implications. Chousalkar (1986) described the development of the Indian context of justice on the bases of analysis of the Vedas and the Mahabharata. He compared the Indian system of justice with the view of Plato as expressed in *Republic.* Among those concerned with developmental aspects, Ghosh and Karmakar (2005) conducted a study on distributive justice and parent-child relationship of 9-15 year old (mean age: 12.40 years) students of Kolkata and its suburbs. They observed that parent-child interaction as well as maturity is instrumental in development of distributive justice in children. Singh and Sandhu (2011) empirically studied the effect of television commercials on the social and moral behaviours of Indian viewers in Chandigarh. The investigation suggests that television commercials 'undermines social and religious values' leading to moral deterioration (p.186). Manhas and Kousar (2012) analysed the level of morality among adolescents as a function of their age and gender. Chaghanti (2012) conducted a study on the moral judgement competence of Indian university students and found that gender socialisation and culture may shape moral competence.

These studies are often piecemeal in nature, lacking an integrated thoughtful approach to comprehend Indian socio-political reality in connection with moral judgment. Methodologically, they are often adaptation of the Western techniques with underlying premises borrowed from the West. Yet, India has its own mechanism of producing and judging morality/immorality; the prioritization of moral issues may be different in Indian cultural identity. For example, violation of family norm may sometimes be considered as more immoral than letting down a friend. The meaning of corruption, disciplining, and care-giving have its own cultural interpretation, often tied to religious doctrines, but given a different interpretation for being usable in day to day life may be discerned in Indian perspective.

Implications and Future Directions

The present article, though limited by its narrow focus, may claim to have some implications by suggesting directions of future research. Moral psychology is still in its formative stage, especially, in India. Morality may be viewed as an interdependent construct having four components: moral sensitivity, moral judgement, moral motivation, and moral character (Rest, 1983). New challenges to the study of moral psychology may stem from any of these areas. Several moral emotions like shame, guilt, gratitude, contempt, embarrassment, empathy disgust, anger etc and their role in human morality are recognised, (Haidt, 2003), although, their specific roles remain unattended.

In today's world, when moral standards are changing and often assuming a more subjective perspective than a normative or objective position, the implications of reasoning and intuition in moral hypocrisy requires attention. Moral hypocrisy involves assuming moral stance for non-moral reasons (Monin & Merritt, 2010) or behavioural departure from one's original moral standings (Stone & Fernandez, 2008). Using a coin tossing experiment, Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, and Wilson (1997) found that although the participants' verbal report indicated an inclination towards fair distribution, given a chance, many would actually act quite opposite. Are these departures sudden or deliberated and controlled?

Morality should not be confined to social or developmental psychology but may be explored as a multidisciplinary approach with psychology being one of the thrust areas. Systematic studies and a comprehensive understanding of human morality may be instrumental in several areas such as forensic sciences, corruption management, and legal sciences. The field of moral psychology is a green pasture with new challenges awaiting explorations from researchers, social scientists, and educationists.

Last but not the least, Indian cultural heritage expressed through a deep and co-evolving tradition of customs, literature, philosophy and law posit an unchartered area for the researcher in moral psychology. Most of the writings dealing with morality in Indian culture come from philosophy, literature or politics, and those within Psychology are often theoretical and speculative. Indeed, this itself is a surprise why psychologists in India,

traditionally concerned with moral issues, fail to engage on this topic systematically. Well designed and multidisciplinary experimental and field research in this domain would unearth a rich arena of indigenous new constructs that promise to enrich the domain of moral psychology.

References

Batson, C. D., Kobrynowicz, D., Dinnerstein, J. L., Kampf, H. C., & Wilson, A. D. (1997). In a very different voice: Unmasking moral hypocrisy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72,* 1335-1348.

Berk, L.E. (2008). *Child Development*. Canada: Pearson Education.

Bucciarelli, M*.,* Khemlani, S. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2008). The psychology of moral reasoning. *Judgment and Decision Making, 3(2),* 121–139.

Bybee, J., & Fleischman, S., (Eds) (1995) *Modality in Grammar and Discourse*. Philadelphia:John Benjamins North America.

Chaghanti, V. K. (2012). A study of moral judgement competence among Indian students. *The FedUni Journal of Higher Education, VII(1),* 53-60.

Chomsky, N. (1965). *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.* Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Chousalkar, A.S. (1986). *Social & Political Implications of Concepts of Justice & Dharma: A comparative Study with Special Reference to the "Republic" and "Shantiparva"*. Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Dalal, A. K. & Misra, G. (2010). The Core and Context of Indian Psychology, *Psychology and Developing Societies*, *22(1)*, 121–55.

Eisenberg, N. (1982). The development of reasoning regarding prosocial behaviour. In N. Eisenberg (Ed.), *The Development of Prosocial Behavior*. New York: Academic Press, 219-249.

Eisenberg, N., Miller, P. A., Shell, R., McNalley, S., & Shea, C.(1991). Prosocial development in adolescence: A longitudinal study. *Developmental Psychology, 27,* 849–857.

Fiske, S.T., & Taylor, S.E. (1991*). Social Cognition* (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Freud, S. (1961). The ego and the id. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 19, pp. 1–66). London: Hogarth. (Original work published 1923).

Gessel, A, & Ilg, G. (1946). *Child development: An Introduction to the Study of Human Growth,* Volumes 1-2. New York: Harper.

Ghosh, A., & Karmakar, R. (2005). Distributive justice and parent-child relationship of school students. In, Akbar Hussain, Shamshad Hussain and Md. Habibur Rahman Khan (Eds.), *Applied Indian Psychology: New Perspective* (p. 19-31.)New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House.

Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer R., Wojcik, S. P. & Ditto, P.H. (in press). Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism. Retrieved from: http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~jessegra/papers/GHKMIWD.inpress.MFT.AESP.pdf downloaded on 10.02.2013

Greene, J. D. (2007). The secret joke of Kant's soul. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), *Moral Psychology*, vol: 3. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 35-79.

Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2009). Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. *Cognition*, *111(3)*, 364–371.

Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. *Cognition*, *107(3),* 1144–1154.

Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. *Neuron, 2*, 389- 400.

Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. *Science, 293(5537)*, 2105–2108.

Haidt J. & Kesebir, S. (2010).Morality. In S. Fiske, D.Gilbert & G. Lindzey (Eds*). Handbook of social psychology, (5th Ed)*, Hobeken, NJ: Wiley. 797-832.

Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. *Psychological Review*, *108(4)*, 814–834.

Haidt, J. (2008). Morality. *Perspectives on Psychological Science. 3 (1).* 65-72.

Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2007). The moral mind: How 5 sets of innate intuitions guide the development

of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.), *The innate mind* (Vol. 3, pp. 367–391). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Haidt, J., Bjorklund, F., & Murphy, S. (2000). Moral dumbfounding: When intuition finds no reason. *(Unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia).*

Haidt, J. (2003). In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.) *Handbook of affective sciences* (pp.852-870). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hartshorne, H,. May, M. A., & Maller J. B. (1929). *Studies in the Nature of Character, Vol. II, Studies in Self-Control*. New York: Macmillan.

Hauser, M. D. (2006). *Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong*. New York: Harper Collins.

Havighurst, Robert J., and Taba, H. (1949). *Adolescent Character and Personality*. New York: Wiley, 1949.

Heider, F. (1958).*The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*. New York: Wiley.

Hume, D. (1965). *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. (Original work published 1777).

Hume, D. (1969). *A Treatise of Human Nature*. London: Penguin. (Original work published 1739 & 1740).

Jaffee, S. & Hyde, J. S. (2000). Gender differences in moral orientation: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin, 126,* 703–726.

Kant, I. (1959). *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals*. (Lewis White Beck, Trans.) Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill. (Original work published 1785).

Kay, W. (1970). *Moral development: A Psychological Study of Moral Growth From Childhood To Adolescence*. Australia: Allen and Unwin.

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence. In D.A. Goslin (Ed.) *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Macaulay E. & Watkins S. H. (1925). An investigation into the development of the moral conceptions of children, Parts I & II. *The Forum of Education,* IV.

Manhas, S., & Kousar R. (2012). Assessment of morality among adolescents of Samba district of Jammu, J&K: *Indian Streams Research Journal, 2(IV)*, 1-4. Retrieved from: http://www. isrj.net/UploadedData/935.pdf.

McDaniel, J. (2007). Hinduism, in John Corrigan

(Ed.). *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion*, (pp. 52-53)) Oxford University Press,

Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence and the future. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 11(4), 143–152.

Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.* 67(4), 371-378.

Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza R., Moll, F., Ignacio F., Bramati I., Caparelli-Daquer E., & Eslinger, P. (2005). The moral affiliations of disgust: a functional MRI study. *Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology*,18,68-78.

Monin, B., & Merritt, A. (2010). Moral hypocrisy, moral Inconsistency, and the struggle for moral Integrity. Upcoming in M. Mikulincer & P. Shaver (Eds.), *The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil, Herzliya Series on Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 3*, American Psychological Association. Retrieved from: http://psych.stanford.edu/ ~monin/papers/Monin%20&%20Merritt%20 Hypocrisy%20chapter.pdf.

Moore, A., Clark, B., & Kane, M. (2008). Who shalt not kill? Individual differences in working memory capacity, executive control, and moral judgment. *Psychological Science, 19*(6)*,* 549–557.

Paranjpe, A.C. (1998). *Self and identity in modern psychology and Indian thought*. New York: Plenum.

Paxton, M.J. & Greene J.D., (2010). Moral reasoning: Hints and allegations. *Topics in Cognitive Science.* 1–17 doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010. 01096.x .

Paxton,M.J., Unger,L. & Greene J.D(2011). Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgement. *Cognitive Science*, 1-15. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011. 01210.x.

Piaget, J. (1932/1965). The Moral Judgment of the Child. London: Free Press.

Pirta, R. S. (2012). Some aspects of empathy in the process of psychotherapy: Learning from Indian tradition. *Psychological Studies,* 57(4), 336-347.

Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2003). The intelligence of moral intuitions: Comment on Haidt (2001). *Psychological Review*, 110(1), 193–196.

Prinz, J. J. Is morality innate? Forthcoming in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), *Moral Psychology*. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from: http:// subcortex.com/MoralityInnatePrinz.pdf.

Radhakrishnan,S. (1923/1996), *Indian Philosophy* , London: Oxford University Press.

Radhakrishnan, S. (1947), *Religion and Society* , London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Renner, W., Ramalingam, P. & Pirta, R. S. (2013) Moral Universals, Ancient Culture and Indian Youth. Part I : Theoretical foundations. *Journal of Indian Academy of Applied Psychology, 39 (2),* 154-163

Rest, J. R. (1983). Morality. In P. H. Mussen (Series Ed.) & J. H. Flavell & E. M. Markman (Vol. Eds.), *Handbook of Child Psychology. Vol. 3: Cognitive Development* . New York: Wiley. 556–629.

Santrock, J. W. (2005). A *Topical Approach to Lifespan Development. (3rd ed)* New Delhi: McGraw-Hill.

Shaffer, D. R. (1994). Do naturalistic conceptions of morality provide any [novel] answers? *Journal of Personality, 62,* 263–268.

Shweder, R. A., Mahapatra, M. & Miller, J.G. (1987). Culture & Moral Development. In J. Kagan & S. Lamb (Eds). *Emergence of Morality in Young Children*. Chicago Press. Chicago University.

Singh, J., & Sandhu, S. (2011). Impact of television commercials on the social and moral behavior of Indian viewers – empirical evidence. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 1(7) [Special Issue –June],*178-187.

Sinha, D. (1997). Indigenizing psychology. In J.W. Berry, Y. Poortinga & J. Pandey (Eds), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Theoretical and methodological perspectives* (Vol. 1), (pp. 130-169), Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Smith, Huston (1991), *The World's Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions*, San Francisco: Harper.

Stone, J., & Fernandez, N. C. (2008). To practice what we preach: The use of hypocrisy and cognitive dissonance to motivate behaviour change. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2,* 1024-1051.

Turiel, E. (1983). *The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Turiel, E. (2006). The development of morality. In W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Series Eds.), & N. Eisenberg (Vol. Ed.), *Handbook of Child Psychology. Vol. 3: Social, emotional, and personality development* (6th ed)). New York: Wiley. 789–857.

Wilson, E. O. (2012). *The social conquest of earth.* New York; Liveright Publishing Corporation.

Swagata Choudhuri, Research Scholar, Department of Applied Psychology, University of Calcutta, Kolkata-700 009. India. Email:swagata.ic@gmail.com,

Jayanti Basu, PhD, Professor, Department of Applied Psychology, University of Calcutta, 92, A.P.C. Road, Kolkata-700 009. India. Email:basumjt@gmail.com